S
ociety relies on the safe functioning of computer-based systems, whether in transportation, energy production, banking, or healthcare. In some sectors, notably high-hazard ones, achieving and assuring safety is a relatively mature undertaking. However, safety-critical systems do fail, as illustrated by occurrences of unintended acceleration in some Toyota cars , and persistent problems reported in medical infusion pumps.
In recent years the challenges of engineering safetycritical systems have been greatly exacerbated by several cybersecurity trends including attackers' growing sophistication, the commoditization of low-end attacks, and the increasing vulnerabilities of digital systems as well as their connectivity-both designed and inadvertent.
Here we share some of the lessons we've learned in our research and practice about the impact of cybersecurity issues on the tempo and approach of engineering safetycritical systems.
SAFETY ENGINEERING
The way systems are engineered to be safe depends on the system criticality. This can range from low criticality, in which a system malfunction could lead to accidents with marginal or negligible severity, to high criticality, in which a system failure or malfunction could result in death and serious injuries to people and/or damage to property or the environment. In many complex systems, such as critical infrastructures, safety is just one attribute of interest.
Achieving and assuring safety is a specialist activity that employs rigorous analysis to identify and mitigate hazards. A wide spectrum of techniques including static source-code analysis; statistical testing; reliability modeling; event trees; failure mode, e ects, and criticality analysis; fault-tree analysis; and formal methods and proofs are used at di erent stages of the development life cycle to analyze system failures and minimize safety risks.
While both safety and security engineering aim to develop trustworthy systems, safety is concerned with protecting the environment from the system and security is concerned with protecting the system from the environment.
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National Institute of Standards and Technology; j.voas@ieee.org immune from malware because it's built using bespoke hardware and software, or that the system can't be attacked because it's separated from the outside world by a so-called "air gap." , In short, safety must be securityinformed: if a safety-critical system isn't secure, it isn't safe.
A safety justi cation or case is incomplete and unconvincing unless it considers security. We used the Claims, Arguments, Evidence (CAE) framework (see the sidebar) to analyze the impact of security on safety justications or cases and found that signicant changes are needed to address security explicitly. These changes could impact system design and implementation as well as assurance and V&V (veri cation and validation).
The following are particularly signi cant from a security perspective:
› supply-chain integrity; › postdeployment malicious events that will change in nature and scope as the threat environment evolves; › reduced lifetime of installed equipment and increased emphasis on system refurbishment and upgrading due to weakening of security controls as attackers' capabilities mature and technologies improve; › threats to the e ectiveness and independence of safety barriers and defense in depth; › design changes to address user interactions, training, con guration, and software vulnerabilities that might lead to additional functional requirements for security controls; and › possible exploitation of the device/service to attack itself or other systems.
Security-informed safety involves technical tradeo s. At the requirements level, for example, developers might need to consider how the security aspects of the information-ow policy under attack or degraded plant conditions impact safety; at the architecture level, they might need to determine whether a critical third-party component has su cient security provenance given its supply chain.
There are various initiatives to integrate security into safety analyses. We've adapted hazard and operability studies of industrial safety-critical system architectures to include additional security guidewords and an enhanced multidisciplinary team. Another area of common ground is static-code analysis: both security and safety perspectives are needed to assess the likelihood of vulnerabilities being exploited and their mitigations' e ectiveness and consequences. The security perspective will increase the analysis's scope and impact the management of discovered vulnerabilities.
There are also business drivers for security-informed safety: stakeholders don't want to pay twice for assurance, or worse, discover con icts between safety and security that signi cantly impact project time scales and require considerable system re-architecting.
RESILIENCE AS WELL AS SAFETY
Another nding from our analysis is that availability is a key issue in industrial systems designed to fail-stop, such as rail transport systems and power plants. This safety philosophy, combined with the complexities of embedded technology, makes denialof-service (DoS) attacks relatively easy. The di culty of stopping such attacks and the attractiveness of many embedded systems to attackers necessitate planning for incident recovery and adaptation: in other words, systems must be resilient. This is particularly true for critical infrastructures, most of which rely on software-based information systems to control operations, monitor activities, and provide realtime responses to events.
A recent example demonstrates just how vulnerable critical infrastructures can be to cyberintrusions. On December , an attack on Ukraine's power grid wrecked the control systems of several regional distribution power companies, causing outages for some , customers. It used multiple attack vectors, including DoS to the phone systems, direct interaction from the adversary, and the installation of malware on workstations and servers to enable the intrusion. This well-crafted cyberattack wasn't the rst to cause outages or physical damage to an industrial control system-previous attacks were successfully carried out against Iranian nuclear centrifuges and a German steel works. Fortunately, such events are still relatively rare. Most cyberattacks target corporate and government networks, resulting in nancial losses and theft of business and personal data. However, these intrusions can either by design or accident impact technologies that support industrial A safety justifi cation or case is incomplete or unconvincing unless it considers security.
processes, opening up opportunities for more consequential attacks. In January 2016, for example, an employee of Israel's Electricity Authority in the Ministry of Infrastructures, Energy, and Water Resources opened a phishing email infected with ransomware that subsequently spread to other computers in the network. If the problem hadn't been quickly identified and resolved, it could have easily given the hackers control over powergrid components. 9
A MODEL-BASED APPROACH
There are numerous drivers for a model-based approach to integrating security and safety: the need to address system scale and connectivity, deal with uncertainties in system structure and connectivity, understand and evaluate systemic risks, and develop incident mitigation and recovery strategies. For many complex systems, especially critical ones, operational system analysis is infeasible.
Critical infrastructures can be modeled in many ways. 10, 11 Our approach, preliminary interdependency analysis (PIA), 12 ,13 looks at both qualitative and quantitative aspects of assessment. The models are partly probabilistic and partly deterministic. The quantified
CLAIMS, ARGUMENTS, EVIDENCE (CAE) FRAMEWORK
The CAE framework consists of three key elements.
Claims are assertions put forward for general acceptance. They're typically statements about a property of the system or some subsystem. Claims asserted as true without justification are assumptions, and claims supporting an argument are subclaims.
Arguments link evidence to a claim. They consist of "statements indicating the general ways of arguing being applied in a particular case and implicitly relied on and whose trustworthiness is well established," 1 together with validation of any scientific laws used. In an engineering context, arguments should be explicit.
Evidence serves as the basis for justification of a claim. Sources of evidence can include the design, the development process, prior field experience, testing (including statistical testing), sourcecode analysis, or formal analysis.
To support the CAE, a graphical notation can be used to describe the interrelationship of claims, arguments, and evidence (see Figure A) .
In practice, top desirable claims such as "the system is adequately secure" are too vague or aren't directly supported or refuted by evidence. It's therefore necessary to create subclaim nodes until the final nodes of the assessment can be directly supported or refuted by evidence.
Safety justifications or cases can be constructed using basic blocks-concretion, substitution, decomposition, calculation, and evidence incorporation 2,3 -as well as narrative analyses that describe the claims, arguments, and evidence in detail.
CAE is supported by tools, 4 an international standard, 5 and industry guidance. 6 A recent rigorous analysis of assurance cases is provided by John Rushby. 7 Figure A. In the CAE framework, claims are supported by arguments, which rely on evidence.
part of the models represents system components as continuous-time state machines and simulates their operation under various assumptions-type of environment, available resources, and so on-when subjected to different threats. The results from multiple simulations are aggregated to calculate metrics of interest. These typically include loss functions such as number of failed components or duration of a particular component's nonworking state. This type of model-based approach and probabilistic design are fundamental to the evaluation of critical infrastructures, and so these models must be trustworthy. Because the models are complicated and rely on complex software for their calculations, we've experimented with using the CAE assurance framework to support an analysis of their trustworthiness. 14 We first make claims about a given system, the environment in which the system operates, and possible attacks on the system in terms of capability and frequency. We then make claims about how a model of the system behaves under simulated attacks and use the CAE framework to analyze whether the models of the system, environment, and attacks are realistic and provide the basis for challenges and peer review. In addition, the CAE framework helps to identify convincing evidence such as published research, insider knowledge, external expert analysis, validation testing of the tools, and performance benchmarks.
Applying the CAE framework can also expose false or unconvincing claims. For example, at the Hack in the Box Security Conference in April 2013, it was claimed that airplanes could be hijacked with an Android phone. 15 A flight simulator was used to demonstrate the ability to remotely control an airplane by sending radio signals to its flight-management system to change the plane's direction, speed, and altitude. However, detailed analysis of the claim using the CAE framework would reveal that the simulator wasn't sufficiently realistic and that the hack wouldn't be possible on actual certified flight systems.
E
ngineering of safety-critical systems must explicitly address cyber security issues, which significantly impact the claims made about such systems and the arguments and evidence used to justify and challenge them. In moving to a modelbased approach to assess the threats to and vulnerabilities of increasingly complex critical infrastructure, we found that CAE provides a valuable framework with which to evaluate the tradeoffs involved in different design choices and to support the innovation and tempo needed to deliver safe and secure systems. 
